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From August 1991 to October 1992, two successive out-
breaks of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
occurred at a hospital in Finland. During and after these out-
breaks, MRSA was diagnosed in 202 persons in our medical
district; >100 cases involved epidemic MRSA. When control
policies failed to stop the epidemic, more aggressive measures
were taken, including continuous staff education, contact isola-
tion for MRSA-positive patients, systematic screening for per-
sons exposed to MRSA, cohort nursing of MRSA-positive and
MRSA-exposed patients in epidemic situations, and perception
of the 30 medical institutions in that district as one epidemio-
logic entity brought under surveillance and control of the infec-
tion control team of Turku University Hospital. Two major
epidemic strains, as well as eight additional strains, were elimi-
nated; we were also able to prevent nosocomial spread of other
MRSA strains. Our data show that controlling MRSA is possible
if strict measures are taken before the organism becomes
endemic. Similar control policies may be successful for dealing
with new strains of multiresistant bacteria, such as vancomy-
cin-resistant strains of S. aureus.  
ethicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has
emerged worldwide as an important nosocomial patho-
gen. In some U.S. hospitals, MRSA already accounts for 30%
to 50% of all nosocomial S. aureus isolates. The situation is
comparable in many European centers: according to a recent
survey (1), the proportion of MRSA compared to all nosoco-
mial S. aureus isolates studied was >50% in Portugal and Italy
and >30% in Turkey and Greece. The methicillin-resistance
rate was low (2.0%) in the Netherlands, calling attention to the
distinguished Dutch MRSA strategy (2). Switzerland, which
had the lowest MRSA prevalence (1.8%) in the European sur-
vey (1), is noted for innovative interventions to improve hand
hygiene in hospitals and, thereby, to reduce MRSA transmis-
sion (3).
In the Scandinavian countries, methicillin-resistant strains
still account for <1% of all nosocomial S. aureus isolates (4).
MRSA has remained uncommon also in Finland (5,6), and
until the 1990s, mostly sporadic cases of MRSA were identi-
fied in hospitalized patients. In recent years, however, several
nosocomial outbreaks caused by different epidemic strains
have occurred (6). Two successive MRSA outbreaks at the
Turku University Hospital, Finland, and in nearby institutions
were the first and, so far, the second largest. We describe the
Turku outbreaks and the subsequent yearly numbers of new
MRSA cases identified in our district. We also discuss the con-
trol measures taken, which have been followed since then, to
confine the spread of epidemic MRSA at the university hospi-
tal and in the whole Southwest Finland Medical District. 
Methods
Background
The Turku University Hospital is a teaching facility that
serves as a tertiary referral center for southwestern Finland.
Approximately 500,000 inhabitants live in the Southwest Fin-
land Medical District; the density of the population varies
from 20–100 inhabitants per square kilometer. The institutions
include 1 university hospital, 1 central hospital, 7 regional hos-
pitals, and 22 health-care centers. 
From August 1991 to October 1992, two successive out-
breaks caused by different MRSA strains occurred in the
departments of surgery and medicine at University Hospital.
During and after these outbreaks, these two MRSA strains
were isolated from patients and staff members in five addi-
tional institutions in our district. 
Screening Policy
Our policy of screening contact patients of the MRSA-pos-
itive patients and the hospital staff for MRSA varied during
the different phases of the outbreaks. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, the term contact patient refers to a patient hospitalized
on the same ward at the same time with an MRSA-positive
patient. 
Surgical Unit Outbreak
During the outbreak in the surgical unit, in most cases
MRSA was isolated from a clinical specimen. Initially, a pol-
icy decision was made not to screen either the contact patients
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of MRSA-positive patients or the staff on outbreak wards for
MRSA. When the number of MRSA cases increased, we per-
formed one cross-sectional study to screen all patients cared
for in the department of surgery during that particular day for
nasal and wound colonization by MRSA. 
Medical Unit Outbreak
After the first two cases were diagnosed in the medical
unit, we began screening other patients treated in the medical
intensive-care unit (ICU). During weeks 6–8, all contact
patients connected with MRSA-positive patients (treated in the
ICU after admission of the index case) were screened once by
using nasal swabs if they were still hospitalized. If a new case
was identified on a ward, the roommates of the patient were
screened. If transmission of MRSA was observed on a ward,
all patients were screened. Initially, screening involved only
nasal swabbing, but from the first week of June 1992 on, cul-
tures were taken also from the perineum, groin, and axillae, as
well as from all open wounds, skin lesions, and, later, the
throat. After 10 identified cases of MRSA, we began to label
case records of the colonized patients and contact patients with
tags showing MRSA information. The contact patients were
screened on the next visit; previous roommates of MRSA-pos-
itive patients were isolated while waiting for culture results.
After providing two sets of negative MRSA cultures, contact
patients were no longer screened on subsequent admissions.
However, patients once found to be MRSA positive were
screened on subsequent admissions and placed in single rooms
to be cared for in contact isolation. All patients previously
treated at hospitals abroad or with a known MRSA problem
were screened at the time of admission and nursed in contact
isolation until results from colonization cultures were nega-
tive. We screened the staffs of the medical ICU and the hema-
tology and infectious diseases units by nasal swab at varying
intervals during the medical outbreak. Screening cultures were
done, as described (7,8).
Identification of MRSA
The isolates grown on culture plates were identified as
MRSA following the National Committee for Clinical Labora-
tory Standards guidelines (9). Genetic resistance to methicillin
was verified by the presence of the mecA gene (10). All
MRSA isolates were submitted to the Staphylococcal Refer-
ence Laboratory at the National Public Health Institute, where
they were typed with the international phage set and ribotyp-
ing and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), as described
(6). Two isolates were defined as different strains if they had
different phage types and/or PFGE and ribotypes. We consid-
ered phage types different if two or more strong phage reaction
differences occurred. Ribotypes were considered different if
any band difference occurred. Before 1995, PFGE types were
considered different if any band difference occurred. After
1995, PFGE types were considered different if four or more
band differences occurred. 
Elimination Treatment
Elimination treatment with topical or combined topical and
systemic antimicrobial therapy was given to selected patients
(e.g., long-term care patients of health-center wards and nurs-
ing homes) and those with severe underlying diseases who
were frequently admitted to any hospital in the district
(7,8,11). Long-term carriers among the staff were also given
elimination treatment. Detailed data on drug regimens will be
reported separately.
Results
MRSA Strains
From 1991 through 2000, a total of 202 persons in the
Southwest Finland Medical District were infected or colonized
by MRSA (Table). On the basis of phage typing and molecular
typing, we identified 15 different MRSA strains isolated from
two or more persons. These strains included 10 isolated from
hospitalized patients (outbreak strains) and 5 causing intrafa-
milial clusters in the community (familial strains). The strain
causing the surgical outbreak (referred to as the surgical strain)
belonged to phage type 75,77,84,85III and had a characteristic
ribotype and PFGE pattern. The strain causing the medical
outbreak (referred to as the medical strain) was nontypable
with phages (NT), but the strain relatedness between different
isolates could be ascertained by ribotyping and PFGE. A third
MRSA strain typed 54,84,85III/96V/95 caused the Mynamaki
Health Center outbreak described previously (7). A detailed
typing analysis, including a picture of the PFGE profiles of
these major epidemic strains, has been published (6) and
describes the corresponding strain identification code as E6 for
the surgical strain, E7 for the medical strain, and O9 for the
Mynamaki strain. The cases involved in these three outbreaks,
as well as the clusters caused by 12 additional MRSA strains,
are summarized in the Table. The remaining 63 strains were
isolated from one person each. 
Three (30%) of 10 outbreak strains and 22 (35%) of 63
unique strains were designated as of foreign origin. None of
the five familial strains were of foreign origin.
MRSA Outbreaks at the University Hospital
Surgical Unit Outbreak
The hospitalization periods of the patients during the surgi-
cal outbreak and the times when MRSA was first isolated in
each case are shown in Figure 1. In August 1991, the surgical
strain was isolated from a bone sample of patient 1 who was
cared for on an orthopedic ward for posttraumatic osteomyeli-
tis. The patient was referred to the infectious diseases unit to
be cared for in contact isolation, but she was readmitted to the
orthopedic ward three times during the following 4 months for
treatment of osteomyelitis. Each time, the isolation precau-
tions followed by hospital personnel did not comply with the
standard adopted later.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 171
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MRSA was next isolated from head wound of a colonized
male patient on the same ward. He was placed in a single room
to be cared for in contact isolation, but when the wound
healed, the patient was transferred to a three-bed room. Subse-
quently, three of his roommates (patients 3, 4, and 5) acquired
MRSA. By the 3rd week of December 1991, the combined
number of patients colonized by epidemic MRSA had
increased to eight cases on two wards and in the surgical ICU.
A shortage of single rooms and the threat of an expanding out-
break led to implementation of the following control mea-
sures: 1) intensive education of the staff on hospital hygiene,
2) nursing of all MRSA-positive patients in single rooms in
contact isolation, preferably in the infectious diseases unit, 3)
strict adherence to contact isolation precautions and minimal
duration of hospitalization whenever an MRSA-positive
patient was treated at the department of surgery (e.g., operative
treatment required), and 4) cross-sectional screening of all
patients nursed on surgical wards and in the surgical ICU on
December 19, 1991, for nasal and wound colonization. The
screening uncovered three new cases of MRSA on epidemic
wards. By year end, all patients identified as MRSA positive
had been either discharged or transferred to the infectious dis-
eases unit. Thereafter, no new transmission of MRSA was
observed on surgical wards, although by the end of August
1993, the surgical strain was isolated from clinical specimens
of eight additional patients who had been cared for on the epi-
demic wards during 1991–1992. These patients had evidently
acquired the surgical strain while hospitalized during the out-
break, but the MRSA colonization was not recognized then
because screening was not done routinely.
In November 1995, the surgical strain was unexpectedly
isolated from an endotracheal aspirate of a patient in the surgi-
cal ICU. This patient had also been cared for on the orthopedic
ward during the 1991 outbreak. Subsequent screening of con-
tact patients in the ICU showed MRSA colonization in three
other patients who had ventilatory support at the same time.
No new transmission of MRSA was observed after these
patients were transferred to the infectious diseases unit. The
total number of University Hospital patients infected or colo-
nized by the surgical strain was 24.
Table. Yearly number of new cases caused by different methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) strains, Southwest Finland Medical 
District, 1991–2000
Year
Strains
Total
Surgical 
outbreaka
Medical 
outbreakb
Mynamaki
outbreakc
MRSA 
outbreak IVd
MRSA 
outbreak Ve
Other 
outbreaks
Familial 
MRSAf
Solitary 
MRSA
1991 11 21 3
1992 19 56 2g 17 8
1993 1 1 13 4 2h 24 2 7
1994 32 5
1995 4 37
1996 2 79
1997 26 8
1998 2g 17 19
1999 2g 21 0 1 4
2000 52 g 41 1 2 2
Total 37 57 13 4 5 10 13 63 202
aStrain was recovered from 24 patients at the university hospital,10 patients at a regional hospital, and 3 staff members in these hospitals.
bStrain was recovered from 30 patients and 18 staff members at the university hospital and from 9 patients in other district institutions. 
cStrain was recovered from 12 patients and 1 staff member in a health-center ward and associated nursing home (7).
dStrain caused a cluster of four cases in an intensive-care unit of a central hospital.
eStrain caused a cluster of four infected patients and one infected staff member in a health-center ward at the beginning of 2000, but was subsequently eliminated.
fIntrafamilial clusters of two to four MRSA cases in the community.       
gMRSA strain was transmitted from one patient to another at the university hospital.
hMRSA strain was transmitted from one patient to another at a regional hospital.
Figure 1. Spread of surgical outbreak strain. Methicillin-resistant Sta-
phylococcus aureus (MRSA) isolated August 1991–October 1992 in 17
patients cared for on two surgical wards and the surgical intensive-care
unit. Hospitalization periods of these patients are shown as horizontal
lines. Symbol • indicates the time point when the first culture positive for
MRSA was taken.RESEARCH
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Medical Unit Outbreak
The index patient was treated for cerebral hemorrhage in
an ICU in Rome, Italy. After his referral to the department of
neurology of University Hospital in December 1991, the med-
ical strain was isolated from his endotracheal aspirate. For the
next 3 months, the patient was cared for in contact isolation in
a single room on a neurologic ward; we found no evidence of
MRSA transmission to other patients on that ward.
Medical ICU
In March 1992, the index patient became ill with septic
shock caused by MRSA and was admitted to the medical ICU
for respiratory support. For the first 24 hours, he was not iso-
lated because of a misunderstanding but treated in the same
room with three other patients who had ventilatory support.
His contact patients were neither screened nor isolated.
Two weeks later (Figure 2), the medical strain was cultured
from an endotracheal aspirate of a patient who had died in the
ICU a few days earlier. The devised screening program was
delayed, and subsequent screening on weeks 6–8 found six
new patient carriers and two staff carriers of MRSA. The med-
ical ICU was closed to new admissions, and an auxiliary ICU
was established for those patients who had not been exposed to
MRSA. 
In the auxiliary ICU, a new staff carrier of MRSA was
identified on week 12 and a new patient carrier and a staff car-
rier on week 13. The MRSA-positive patient was immediately
referred to the infectious diseases unit. The six other patients
who had shared the ICU room with him were simultaneously
transferred to that same unit. Screening cultures later revealed
MRSA colonization in five of them, indicating that early
cohorting of these contact patients may have been critical in
preventing further spread.
Hematology Unit
In May 1992, we identified MRSA colonization in four
patients cared for on the hematology ward. Two of them
became colonized while being treated in the medical ICU in
April and transmitted MRSA to their two roommates on the
ward before carriage became manifest. Using nasal swabs, we
screened a number of patients treated at that time on the same
ward. Many other contact patients already discharged were not
screened when they were readmitted, rendering further spread
of MRSA possible. At the beginning of July 1992, MRSA was
isolated from an endotracheal aspirate of a bone marrow trans-
plant patient cared for on the hematology ward (Figure 2).
Subsequent screening showed colonization in 11 additional
hematologic patients and 12 staff members.
We prevented nosocomial transmission by immediately
closing the hematology ward. For the next 3 months, hemato-
logic patients were cared for in three separate cohorts: 1) those
not exposed to MRSA were admitted to the hematology unit
when it was reopened, 2) those potentially exposed to MRSA
during the previous 4 months were cared for in a separate
cohort in the infectious diseases unit until three sets of coloni-
zation cultures had proved negative, and 3) those colonized by
MRSA were cared for in the infectious diseases unit. The total
number of University Hospital patients colonized by the medi-
cal strain was 30, and the last case was identified in February
1993. This patient had evidently become colonized in April
1992 while being treated in the ICU at the same time as the
index case. His MRSA colonization had remained unknown,
since contact patients were not screened at that time.
Staff Carriage
A total of 20 staff members were colonized with MRSA
during these two outbreaks. All five long-term carriers
received elimination treatment with a successful outcome. The
staff members who were colonized were sent home but could
return to work after they had provided three successive nega-
tive MRSA cultures.
MRSA in Other District Institutions
In August 1992, the first case of the surgical strain was
identified at Turku City Hospital. Subsequent screening found
colonization in seven additional patients on three different
wards. After two more cases were identified in 1996, the total
number of city hospital patients colonized by the surgical
strain was 10. During August and September 1992, we found
nine patients in two local hospitals and two health-center
wards colonized by the medical strain. In each institution,
MRSA was first isolated from a clinical sample, and screening
of contact patients on the ward found a few additional cases.
The infection control team of University Hospital visited each
facility to delineate appropriate control measures for MRSA.
Colonized patients were referred to the infectious diseases unit
for elimination treatment. Other patients were screened, and
those found to be colonized were cared for in contact isolation
until they could be admitted to the infectious diseases unit for
decolonization. By following this strict control policy, we
were able to eliminate MRSA from these five institutions.
In 1993, the Mynamaki Health Center outbreak was con-
trolled as previously described after 13 cases (7), and a central
Figure 2. Number of new cases weekly of methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus among patients and staff during the medical outbreak,
third week of March to the second week of September 1992. Time is
shown in weeks from the admission of the index case (black column) to
the medical intensive-care unit. White columns indicate patient cases;
striped columns indicate staff cases.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 173
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hospital ICU outbreak was controlled after four cases (out-
break strain IV). In 2000, MRSA outbreak strain V was elimi-
nated from a long-term care facility after five cases occurred.
Of the five additional epidemic MRSA strains, one was elimi-
nated after two cases in a regional hospital, and the other four
strains were eliminated after causing two cases each at Univer-
sity Hospital (Table).
Long-Term Follow-Up of Patients
Of the 37 patients who acquired the surgical strain, 6 died
within 1 month after MRSA was identified, 20 died during the
following years, and 3 were not part of follow-up. Eight
patients remain residents in our district, two of them still car-
rying the surgical strain. The majority of the 39 patients who
acquired the medical strain had severe underlying diseases. Of
all 39 patients, 21 died within 3 months of colonization, 12
died during the following years, and 1 was not part of follow-
up. Five patients who still live in Turku, three of whom were
treated to eliminate carriage, no longer carry MRSA. Thus, the
medical strain has been eliminated from our district.
Discussion
During past few years, news on MRSA has usually been
discouraging. Clinicians and infection control practitioners
appear to have lost confidence in their capability to control the
nosocomial spread of this pathogen. The number of papers
focusing on the overwhelming spread of MRSA is increasing
(1,12–17), whereas those addressing successful efforts of con-
trol or stating that nosocomial spread of MRSA can and should
be controlled are few (18–22). A number of researchers debat-
ing the control of MRSA have questioned whether controlling
this microorganism is reasonable, feasible, or justified (23–25)
and whether the tracing of colonized people is justified (26).
We describe the elimination of MRSA from a university hospi-
tal and a medical-district–wide control policy for MRSA after
the outbreak. Our results show that controlling or even elimi-
nating MRSA is possible, if strict measures are systematically
taken before the organism becomes endemic. Our experience
should encourage other countries with a low incidence of
MRSA to continue efforts to prevent the spread of this micro-
organism in hospitals and long-term care facilities.
According to 46 published reports on outbreaks, 10% of
the hospitals with >40 cases have achieved definite or proba-
ble elimination of MRSA (27). Although >100 patients and
staff members in our district initially became colonized by epi-
demic MRSA, this microbe is being controlled almost 10 years
after these first outbreaks. We eliminated the medical strain
from the whole district, and only a few outpatients presently
carry MRSA in the community. Moreover, we were able to
prevent nosocomial spread of the almost 100 additional
MRSA strains encountered in our area. Even the 22 MRSA
strains introduced by patients transferred from hospitals
abroad have remained solitary cases, despite their epidemic
potential. In fact, after the small university hospital ICU out-
break in 1995, nosocomial transmission of MRSA has been
detected in our district hospitals only three times; on each
occasion, MRSA colonization of the index case was not
known or suspected on admission. 
Containment of the Turku outbreaks in 1991–1992 was
greatly impeded by the fact that we had no national guidelines
on how to control MRSA in Finland at that time and very little
previous experience with these microorganisms. Detailed
guidelines published by authorities from abroad advised an
active control policy (28), but stringent measures were per-
ceived by our colleagues as too disruptive for the patient care
in our institution. One major argument against adopting an
aggressive line of control was the lack of severe MRSA infec-
tions because many of our patients were colonized without
clinical infection. During the early phase of the medical out-
break, the infection control team adjusted to a lenient control
policy because of our previous experience with the surgical
strain, which was easily contained. The behavior of the medi-
cal strain, however, was quite different from the surgical
strain, and the inadequacy of the control measures at the
beginning of the medical outbreak is now evident. We may
have been able to restrict this outbreak to only a few cases if
all ICU patients had been screened for MRSA and MRSA-pos-
itive patients had been isolated as soon as we discerned that
appropriate control measures had not been taken when caring
for the index patient or if the medical ICU had been closed to
new admissions after the second or third MRSA case. Simi-
larly, screening of only some of the MRSA contact patients in
the hematology unit in May 1992 was clearly insufficient. Had
our efforts initially been more aggressive and the outbreaks
quickly controlled, we may have saved many persons from
becoming colonized with MRSA and considerably reduced the
costs of infection control measures required. 
The most important lesson from these first epidemics was
that an ambivalent and permissive control policy for MRSA
easily fails. We have subsequently made every effort to avoid
making the same mistake. Whenever MRSA has been intro-
duced into our hospitals, rapid steps have been taken to adopt
appropriate control measures. The mainstays of our present
policy involve continuous staff education, caring for MRSA-
positive patients in single rooms in contact isolation, system-
atic screening of patients exposed to MRSA, including all
patients transferred from hospitals abroad or with a known
MRSA problem, and cohort nursing of MRSA-positive and
exposed patients, at least in epidemic situations. 
National guidelines have proved most beneficial in pre-
venting the spread of MRSA in a few low-incidence countries
(2,6). Medical-district–wide guidelines may be equally impor-
tant when an individual hospital is struggling with MRSA and
needs practical or moral support. The Turku MRSA policy
involves perceiving our medical district with its approximately
30 institutions as one epidemiologic entity; the infection con-
trol team of University Hospital is responsible for the control
of MRSA (and also of other multiresistant bacteria) in the
whole entity. This overall responsibility ensures that the same
control policy for MRSA is followed in all district institutions.RESEARCH
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If MRSA is encountered in any local hospital or health-center
ward, consultation is given; if nosocomial transmission of the
microbe is observed, the infection control team visits the insti-
tute. We continuously strive to prevent the development of
MRSA reservoirs in our extended-care facilities. In so doing,
treatment to eliminate MRSA carriage in long-term patients
has been favored, while in contrast, efforts to eliminate MRSA
in outpatients have not had the same focus.
Many of our experiences were taken into account when the
National Guidelines for the Control of MRSA in Finland were
prepared in 1995 (6). To a great extent, the MRSA control pol-
icy finally adopted is in line with that currently followed in the
Netherlands (2) and initially recommended by the British
authorities in 1990 (28). Because of the increasing prevalence
of MRSA, those guidelines were replaced in the U.K. by more
lenient instructions in 1998 because the situation in many parts
of the country was such that a more flexible approach was con-
sidered appropriate (29,30). With the dramatic increase of
MRSA, other countries (including the United States) where
these microbes are already endemic in hospitals have adopted
more flexible control policies (31,32). However, now that van-
comycin-resistant S. aureus (VRSA) exists (33), controlling
MRSA is even more imperative. A lenient or ambivalent pol-
icy is especially inappropriate in those countries where MRSA
remains uncommon, since they may still have a fair chance of
eliminating this pathogen. In southwestern Finland, the factors
possibly contributing to our success include active education
and excellent compliance of health-care personnel, a uniform
health-care system, and low population density.
Anticipating the emergence of new and even more serious
strains of multiresistant staphylococci poses a demanding
challenge to clinicians and infection-control practitioners
worldwide to seek novel methods, which could effectively pre-
vent the spread of these microorganisms. Despite an inability
to control MRSA in many countries, we believe that confining
these newly emerging multiresistant strains may be possible,
provided that vigorous efforts are taken early while the
microbe still remains rare. If rapidly begun, aggressive mea-
sures may not be needed for long and thereby be cost-effec-
tive. To meet future challenges successfully, a stringent and
consistent international control policy should be issued and
universally obeyed. 
We have shown that controlling or even eliminating
MRSA is possible, if strict measures are taken before the
organism becomes endemic. A similar policy may be success-
ful when combating new and even more serious strains of mul-
tiresistant bacteria (e.g., VRSA). The recent emergence of
VRSA emphasizes the need for unremitting and vigorous con-
trol of MRSA. National guidelines for MRSA control policy
have proven beneficial in a few low-incidence countries. Our
results suggest that firm international guidelines will aid coun-
tries in preventing the global spread of any newly emerging
multiresistant bacterial pathogen. An ultimate prerequisite for
success is the commitment of the health-care personnel world-
wide to struggle for that important goal.
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